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 Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading: 
 An Interim Report 
 
 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO Subsidies Agreement 
Richard W. Parker* 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment has gathered a 
prominent group of policy analysts to consider how the United States might implement its Kyoto 
commitment, using tradable permits in tandem with other methods.  The draft report of the group, 
entitled Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading: Interim Report, examines four 
policy options.  This Memorandum considers whether any of these options appear likely to conflict with 
United States international trade obligations under the newly established Uruguay Round Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’).    
This summary outlines the relevant law and summarizes my conclusions on the WTO issues 
raised by the options. The full analysis supporting those conclusions is contained in the Memorandum 
that follows.  
The principal WTO issues raised by the Interim Report are: (1) whether the product standards 
envisioned by Options I, III and IV provide national (non-discriminatory) treatment to foreign products; 
and  (2) whether the grant of free permits under the cap-and-trade schemes of Options I, III and IV 
would comprise an ‘actionable subsidy’ under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (Subsidies Agreement).2    
                                                 
     *Author has served as Special Counsel to Deputy Administrator and Coordinator for Trade and Environment 
Policy at EPA; and Assistant General Counsel at Office of the United States Trade Representative.  He is currently 
Associate Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, where he teaches and writes in the fields of Trade 
and Environment, International Environmental Law, and domestic Environmental Law. 
     2 The United States, historically, has been the main user of the Subsidies Agreement (and its WTO 
predecessors).   Other countries are much less active as plaintiffs in the field of subsidies.   This, coupled with the 
‘halo effect’ of the climate change issue, might shelter all the options described in the Interim Report from any 
subsidies challenge.  That happy result should not be assumed, however.  Three of the options described in the 
Report are clearly designed to ‘compensate’ U.S. industry.  Moreover, the activity level of other countries is rising, 
and ‘climate change’ policies that come to be regarded as cloaks for disguised protection will not only enjoy no halo 
effect, they might well trigger a backlash.  Finally, it will be seen that many of the straight and narrow doctrinal 
positions previously advocated by the United States in its capacity as a subsidy plaintiff (and advocate of stricter 
disciplines) could come back to haunt the United States in defending various climate change strategies from 
subsidies challenge. 
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This Memorandum concludes that U.S. product standards imposing minimum mileage or energy 
efficiency requirements for products -- be they cars, trucks, refrigerators, or air conditioners -- are not 
likely to raise WTO concerns so long as they are crafted in a way that does not discriminate against 
imported products.3   The more difficult issue is whether and under what circumstances the grant of free 
permits under Options I, III and IV would constitute an actionable subsidy.   
 
The WTO Subsidies Agreement defines an ‘actionable subsidy’ as (1) a non-de minimis ‘financial 
contribution’ that (2) is bestowed on ‘specific’ enterprises or industries; and (3) causes or threatens 
‘injury’ or ‘serious prejudice’ to foreign manufacturers of like products.   
 
A ‘financial contribution’, for our purpose, is a government practice analogous to a direct transfer 
of funds.  The contribution is non-de minimis if it yields, directly or indirectly, a benefit that is greater 
than 1 percent of the receiving firm’s total sales of all products or, if the subsidy is limited to certain 
products, 1 percent of the firm’s total sales of the subsidized products.  Here, the ‘financial contribution’ 
derives from the fact that ‘surplus’ permits – those not needed to meet regulatory operating requirements 
– can be sold for cash.   The fact that the cash derives from non-governmental third parties is irrelevant 
– indirect subsidies are subsidies.  The fact that a subsidy is received as partial compensation for much 
higher fuel costs and/or fuel conversion costs or other regulatory compliance costs is likewise irrelevant: 
with one small exception not applicable here, the Subsidies Agreement treats subsidies for regulatory 
compliance just like any other subsidy.  Moreover, except in the special case of upstream subsidies as 
described below, it makes no difference whether the receiving firm uses the subsidy to lower prices and 
expand market share at the expense of foreign competitors, or whether it simply returns the subsidy as 
rent to employees, management or shareholders.   So permits are a financial contribution to the extent 
that they are surplus to operating needs.  This Memorandum argues, however, that only ‘surplus’ permits 
are a financial contribution.  Permits issued and used to support on-going operations are more 
appropriately classified as regulatory instruments – they calibrate the degree of emissions reduction 
required – rather than subsidies. 
                                                 
     3A GATT dispute panel recently upheld a U.S. standards law closely analogous to the standards schemes 
discussed in the Interim Report, even though the standard was crafted in a way that burdened foreign producers, de 
facto, more heavily than their U.S. rivals.  General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade: United States -- Taxes on 
Automobiles, DS 31/R, Sept. 29, 1994.  While that decision is not a binding precedent, it does suggest that the 
scrutiny given to facially neutral product standards is likely to be fairly lenient.  The safest course, obviously, is to 
avoid regulations which have any differential and adverse impact on imports. 
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The ‘specificity’ requirement of the Subsidies Agreement is needed to avoid the absurdity of 
holding generally available subsidies (like roads, bridges, schools, tax deductions, etc.) actionable under 
the WTO.   The specificity doctrine thus holds that subsidies made available, and used, economy-wide 
are non-specific, while those confined (de jure or de facto) to a single industry or enterprise are specific.   
What is unclear is whether subsidies made available to, and used by, several large industry groups – but 
not the whole economy – would be considered specific.  We know that the question would be analyzed 
in two parts: (1) is a ‘small’ number of enterprises or industries legally eligible for the subsidies (de jure 
specificity); and if not, (2) does a ‘small’ number of enterprises or industries disproportionately use the 
subsidies (de facto specificity).   We know that subsidies need not be made available economy-wide in 
order to be non-specific: the U.S. has repeatedly held, for example, that subsidies to the ‘agricultural 
sector’ are de jure non-specific due to the wide variety of products encompassed in that sector.  We also 
know, from the precedents, that there appears to be an inter-play between enterprise numericity and 
industry diversity: subsidies made available to a large number of firms in a single (or two) industries will 
be considered specific; subsidies extending to only a few firms in different industries are also likely to be 
deemed specific; but subsidies extending to a large number of firms spanning a wide variety of different 
industries are likely to be deemed non-specific, unless a few firms or industries receive a disproportionate 
share of the benefits.   In the last analysis, however, confident predictions are hard to make:  both the 
WTO Agreement and U.S. doctrine and practice are intentionally vague on what is a  ‘small’ number of 
firms or industries; specificity determinations in intermediate situations (such as ours) are made case-by-
case and without clear guidelines.   
 
The ‘injury’ and ‘serious prejudice’ tests are a ‘rule of reason’ for subsidies law.  They hold that 
importing governments may not take action against subsidized products that do not cause or threaten 
‘injury’ to competing manufacturers in their own market; nor may they complain of subsidies that do not 
cause or threaten ‘serious prejudice’ to competitors in the exporting country market or in third-country 
markets.  Note the difference in formulation: ‘injury’ may be caused by subsidized products (regardless 
of the margin of subsidy); serious prejudice must result from the impact of the subsidy itself (in which 
case the margin of subsidy is likely to be relevant).  In both cases, the indicia of harm are similar: price 
cutting and/or market share expansion (or retention) beyond that which would occur without the 
subsidy/subsidized import.   Because of the highly fact-specific nature of the injury and serious prejudice 
determinations, they are very difficult to predict in the abstract.   Most of the legal analysis of this 
Memorandum will thus focus on the application of the first two requirements. 
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Option I features a tradable permits scheme and a series of energy efficiency product standards.  
The permit scheme would cap aggregate emissions from large U.S. stationary fossil fuel combustors (e.g. 
facilities using boilers of greater than 100 million Btus/hour or consuming more than 1,000 tons of coal 
per year).  The cap would be set at 510 million tons of carbon (MtC) per year, distributed among covered 
sources according to each source’s pro rata share of carbon emissions in some baseline year, such as 
1990.   Under the formula, it is expected that 375 MtC would be allocated to electricity generators.  The 
remaining 135 MtC would be allocated among a variety of industrial combustors that meet the ‘large 
source’ criteria: petroleum products and petrochemicals, basic organic and inorganic chemicals, 
pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, paints, adhesives, soaps and cleaning compounds,  pulp and paper 
and paper products, resins, synthetic rubber and man-made fibers, primary metals, and cement, glass, 
bricks, lime and other stone and ceramic products.   New large sources (those constructed after the 
baseline year) would receive no permits.   Sources would be free to buy and sell permits as needed to 
support their operations, but all sources, new and old, would be required to hold one  permit for every ton 
of carbon emitted, and that permit would be consumed by the emission of that ton.  The permit scheme 
would cover only U.S. manufacturers.   Assuming, as the Interim Report does, that permits would be 
valued at $75 each, the total value of all permits issued to electricity generators and large industrial 
combustors would be $28 billion and $10 billion, respectively. 
 
The key issue raised by Option I is whether it will bestow non-de minimis subsidies on ‘specific’ 
enterprises and industries causing injury or serious prejudice to foreign competitors.   Option I makes a 
large number and wide variety of sources eligible for permits: it is unlikely to be deemed de jure specific. 
To the extent that Option I distributes ‘surplus’ permits relatively thinly and widely across the categories 
of eligible users, it seems most unlikely that Option I will yield either de facto specific or greater than de 
minimis subsidies. (Remember, most sources that continue in full operation will receive far fewer permits 
than they need to support even baseline year sales under traditional manufacturing methods: any 
‘surpluses’ they achieve will likely be rather meager in relation to their overall production levels.)   
Thus, the principal way that Option I could lead to subsidies trouble is if it allocates permits in a way that 
has the effect of focusing a large number and the predominant share of ‘surplus’ permits on relatively few 
firms and/or industries.  Such a concentration of large surpluses would lead to a finding of de facto 
specificity and would increase the likelihood of non-de minimis subsidies.   There are two ways such a 
concentration might come about in practice.  First, Option I appears to award permits on the basis of 
historic emissions, rather than on the basis of sources’ estimated potential for future emissions reduction.  
5 
 
This increases the likelihood of concentrating substantial surpluses among those lucky firms/industries 
that happen to enjoy abundant, low-cost emissions reductions opportunities.  Second, Option I as written 
appears to contemplate that sources made eligible for permits as a result of their emissions in the baseline 
year will continue to accrue permits for their owners even if the source is later closed or radically 
downsized.  Such a rule will virtually ensure the accrual of significant, potentially actionable subsidies 
for owners who close or downsize covered U.S. manufacturing facilities.4   Concern for subsidies 
consequences would counsel (1) amending the allocation formula to reflect a ‘best guess’ of the average 
emissions reduction potential for various classes and categories of sources; and (2) implementing Option I 
under a rule which limits (perhaps time limits) the ability of firms to accrue permits in respect of closed or 
downsized manufacturing facilities.  
 
The preceding analysis examined the award of permits to large industrial combustors.  Subsidies 
concerns might also arise in relation to the award of gratis permits to electricity generators.  Although 
most electric utilities do not sell their product internationally, electric utilities do sell power to 
manufacturing facilities and if their power is deemed subsidized, the manufactured product would be 
deemed to have received an ‘upstream subsidy.’   Under long-standing U.S. practice (unmodified by the 
Uruguay Round), an upstream subsidy is defined as any subsidy that (1) is paid on an input product; (2) 
bestows a competitive advantage on the downstream product; and (3) has a significant effect on the cost 
of manufacturing the downstream product.  If an upstream subsidy is deemed specific to the utility, the 
specificity finding would apply to all downstream buyers from that plant, regardless of their number and 
diversity.  Thus, the key issue is whether electricity generators who are able to amass large surpluses pass 
the benefit through to their customers (or, worse, to certain, favored industrial customers) and whether the 
passed through benefit represents a significant portion of manufacturing cost and bestows a competitive 
advantage on the manufactured product.   In this analysis, the benchmark for comparison will be, not 
electricity prices pre-Option I, but what electricity prices would be under Option I without the grant of 
surplus permits to the generator.  Further economic analysis would be needed to assess the likelihood of 
competitively significant electricity subsidies being conferred under Option I.  
 
                                                 
     4A rule that ‘subsidizes’ plant closure is also likely to generate political opposition.   Regardless of whether 
the plant closure reflects a decision to exit the industry (creating a market opportunity for imports) or to re-locate  
manufacturing overseas, critics will charge that the result is the same: domestic production is replaced by imports, 
U.S. jobs are lost, and (since foreign facilities also release greenhouse gases) global carbon emissions are simply 
displaced, not reduced.  
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Option II seeks near total coverage of carbon emissions within an administratively manageable 
cap and trade permit scheme.  It would require, and ration, permits for the sale of all carbon fuels (coal, 
oil and natural gas), while imposing the permit requirement at the narrowest points in the energy 
distribution chain.  Permits would be auctioned (rather than given away) at the point of extraction for 
coal, refining for petroleum, and distribution for natural gas.  Permits would also be required for imports 
of refined petroleum products.  The cost of permits would confront all users of energy with price 
increases (highest for carbon-rich coal) that would encourage them to conserve fuel and/or switch to 
lower carbon fuels. 
 
This Memorandum concludes that Option II would pose no conflict with WTO rules provided it 
is implemented in a manner which does not discriminate covertly against imports by, for example, 
calculating the carbon content of foreign and domestic fuels/products by a discriminatory methodology 
that requires foreign suppliers to hold more permits per unit than similarly situated domestic producers.  
 
Option III is described as a ‘more complex, but possibly more politically attractive’ permit 
system.  Besides imposing a series of energy-efficiency product standards (as in Option I), it would 
require all extractors of coal, oil and natural gas to hold a permit for each unit of fuel sold in the United 
States.  The overall supply of permits -- and the U.S. supply of fossil fuel -- would be capped at a level 
that promotes compliance with the Unites States’ Kyoto commitment.   Permits would be issued free-of-
charge to coal, oil and gas extractors based on each supplier’s pro rata share of the U.S. market in some 
baseline year, such as 1990.   However, half the supply of permits that otherwise would go to coal 
extractors would be diverted to coal combustors, who would receive the permits free of any regulatory 
obligation.  Since combustors would have no need of the permits they receive, it is expected that 
combustors would simply sell their permits back to coal, oil or gas extractors who do need them.   
Since Option III treats oil and gas producers, coal producers, and coal combustors differently, 
each requires a separate WTO analysis.  Oil and gas producers will find their permits to produce and 
import oil and gas rationed under Option III.  The national treatment provisions of the WTO Agreement 
will require that domestic and imported oil and gas be assigned permits under the same formula (unless 
there is a compelling reason not to do so).   This should not raise undue political opposition in the United 
States, since it is well understood by now that the WTO requires national treatment of all products, 
including oil and gas products.5   Moreover, Option III should not raise subsidies issues in respect of oil 
                                                 
     5The WTO Agreement will not require the United States to grant permits to pariah nations like Iran and Iraq 
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and gas producers if, as seems likely, such producers continue to supply oil and gas up to the level 
allowed by the number of permits allocated them, or affordable at market prices.   Subsidies issues will 
begin to arise only at the point at which individual oil and gas producers begin to accumulate major stores 
of ‘surplus’ permits.   Foreign oil and gas producers can probably be precluded, if necessary, from 
amassing large surpluses.6   But domestic oil and gas producers would be deemed to have received a 
specific subsidy, and it would be actionable if the other conditions mentioned above were met.   
 
Oil and gas producers could generate large surpluses only by reducing sales in the United States 
market below their baseline-year levels.   Given that coal conversion is likely to increase the demand for 
oil and gas, why would any profit-maximizing oil and gas company choose to reduce its U.S. sales?  
Mainly because, under Option III as written, every unit of oil/gas that was sold by a company in the 
allocation baseline year generates one permit a year, in perpetuity, for the selling company.  If the 
corresponding unit of oil and gas is diverted overseas in the allocation year, that generates a subsidy -- in 
the form of a one free, salable permit each year -- for the diverting oil and gas company.   Given this 
incentive, oil and gas companies with historic U.S. sales almost certainly will choose to divert some 
traditional U.S. supplies of oil and gas to overseas markets.  That diversion will create a price-spike of oil 
and gas in the United States which will either lure in new suppliers who will buy permits to meet the 
demand, or reduce the incentive for historic suppliers to divert.  Eventually, supply and demand will 
equilibrate at a U.S. price which equals the overseas price of oil and gas plus the market value of the 
associated permits.   From the standpoint of U.S. oil and gas consumers, Option III will be identical to 
Option II in terms of energy price impact: unit energy prices will increase by the full amount of the cost 
of purchasing the corresponding permits.   But the revenues that would go to the government under 
Option II’s auction system will be lavished on historic oil and gas suppliers as subsidies under Option III.  
In practice, few foreign countries are likely to complain of receiving subsidized oil and gas from the 
United States or erstwhile U.S. suppliers.   But the U.S. political opposition to such a scheme could be 
considerable, and WTO subsidies issues could arise if oil and gas companies use revenues from the sale 
of surplus permits to ‘cross-subsidize’ other manufactured products into which those companies diversify: 
                                                 
under Option III any more than it requires the United States to import oil and gas from these countries now.  Such 
countries have long been excluded from the United States market under the national security exceptions of GATT 
Article XXI.  Option III would not change that.   
     6While a WTO panel might conceivably regard this as a violation of the national treatment norm, the better 
view is that such a rule simply channels the subsidy element implicit in surplus permits to domestic providers.  The 
WTO Agreement expressly exempts domestic subsidies from national treatment obligations. 
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indirect subsidies are subsidies.  One way to avoid this result is to craft an anti-diversion rule for Option 
III: e.g. reduce each oil and gas firm’s entitlement to ‘surplus’ permits (permits in excess of allocation-
year U.S. oil and gas sales) by the amount of any increase in that firm’s overseas sales of oil and gas in 
the allocation year (or increase above a certain level) compared to the baseline year. 
 
The treatment of coal extractors under Option III raises somewhat different concerns.   Coal 
extractors will receive a supply of permits that reflects less than half their baseline year production.  
They also will confront a shrinking domestic demand for coal.  To the extent they respond by simply 
downsizing operations to a level that reflects the reduced demand and the scarcity of available and 
affordable permits, no WTO issues will arise.  However, some coal extractors may choose to reduce 
domestic coal sales by more than the amount required by the scarcity of permits.  Revenues from sales of 
surplus permits could then be used to cross-subsidize (a) increased coal sales in foreign markets 
(‘diversion’), or (b) transition from coal mining into some other line of production (‘industry exit’).   
Certainly diversion of sales to foreign markets will be attractive to mining companies who wish to stay in 
the business.  Although coal extractors will see half of their permits siphoned off to combustors, it is 
conceivable that certain extractors with historically large U.S. sales could divert so much coal to foreign 
markets that they would amass a considerable revenue stream from sale of now-‘surplus’ permits.  
Besides undermining the global climate benefit, such a response could elicit subsidies challenges from 
foreign coal suppliers.  Similarly, coal extractors who choose to exit the coal mining business -- by 
shifting/diversifying into non-coal product lines -- might also accumulate considerable revenues from sale 
of permits awarded them in respect of historic production levels.  This could raise a risk of subsidies 
challenge from foreign manufacturers of these other products.  If these diversion/exit scenarios are 
deemed plausible, they may argue for some limitation (perhaps time limits) on the eligibility of 
diverting/exiting coal extraction firms to continue to receive permits in respect of historic coal production. 
 
The treatment of coal combustors under Option III could raise issues under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement, though a proper assessment of the litigation risk would require further economic analysis.  
Clearly, the free permits issued to coal combustors would all be ‘surplus’ to those combustors and would 
all be sold back to extractors for cash or fuel purchase price offsets.   Ninety (90) percent of the permits 
awarded coal combustors under Option III would flow to coal-fired electric power plants and would 
clearly be deemed a ‘specific’ subsidy.   Although most electric utilities do not sell anything moving in 
international trade, Option III would raise the ‘upstream subsidy’ issues discussed under Option I, with 
one crucial difference:  Option III likely will to leave electric utilities with many more ‘surplus’ permits.  
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The remaining 10 percent of the coal combustors’ share of permits would be distributed among 
about ten major industry groups, with a concentration in four: primary metals, paper and paper products, 
chemicals and allied products, and food products.  None of these industry groups would receive even 2 
percent of the overall subsidy.  While the law on specificity is somewhat vague, as mentioned, a review 
of available precedents suggests that a de jure or de facto specificity finding on these facts is unlikely.  
 
Option IV inverts Option III, with a twist.   Instead of requiring extractors to hold permits to 
sell and issuing ‘freeby’ permits to large combustors (as in Option III), Option IV would require large 
combustors to hold permits to emit while issuing permits to large combustors and coal extractors.  Since 
coal extractors would  not need the emissions permits issued to them, they would sell the permits back to 
the combustors.  Option IV is thus made politically attractive to coal extractors in the same way that 
Option III is attractive to coal combustors.  The ‘twist is that auto manufacturers who sell in the United 
States market also would be required to hold emissions permits (allocated on the basis of each 
automaker’s future emissions commitment for its fleet.)  Automakers would be allowed to trade permits 
with combustors or coal extractors on a market basis, subject to the regulatory requirement that each 
automaker must hold one permit for each unit of future emissions predicted from its fleet.   
 
This Memorandum concludes that the issuance of permits to automakers and their inclusion 
within the cap and trade scheme of Option IV would not raise serious WTO issues provided that fleet 
emissions are forecast via methodologies that are consistent for all fleets  and do not discriminate against 
foreign manufacturers.  The treatment of large stationary combustors seems unlikely to raise significant 
WTO issues since such combustors, under Option IV, will not receive any meaningful volumes of surplus 
permits except, again, to the extent they exit their industries, and they are unlikely to exit their main line 
of business merely in order to generate a relatively meager ration of surplus permits.  The preferential 
treatment afforded domestic coal extractors, on the other hand, would raise the subsidies issues discussed 
in connection with the treatment of coal extractors under Option III, aggravated by the fact that coal 
extractors under Option IV would receive permits unencumbered by regulatory obligations, and thus 
would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with.  In practice, the United States is an insignificant 
importer of coal, so foreign governments are not likely to bother complaining of domestic coal subsidies 
on import substitution grounds.  The main risk of a subsidies challenge would arise if, and to the extent 
that, U.S. coal extractors use revenues from permit sales to cross-subsidize coal (or other product) sales in 
foreign markets. 
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 Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading: 
 An Interim Report 
 
 Comments on WTO Aspects 
Richard W. Parker 
   
In the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States 
committed, subject to Senate ratification, to reduce aggregate net emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
by 8 percent below 1990 levels within the period 2008-2012.  It is now widely accepted that this 
commitment cannot be met by voluntary measures.  Increased energy taxes seem politically out of the 
question in the United States.   Businesses are more favorably inclined to the idea of tradable emissions 
permits (assuming anything is to done), and it is now widely agreed that any U.S. initiative to comply 
with its Kyoto commitment is likely to feature some variation on the theme of tradable emissions permits.  
Yet, until now, very little detailed work has been done on what a tradable emissions scheme for GHG 
might look like.    
 
The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment has gathered a 
prominent group of policy analysts to study the question of how the United States might implement its 
Kyoto commitment, using tradable permit approaches in tandem with other methods.  (Supplementary 
methods, as discussed below, are necessary because of the incredible number and variety of GHG 
sources, many of which are too small and/or difficult to monitor to incorporate in a manageable GHG 
emissions trading scheme.)  The draft report of the group, entitled Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Through Emissions Trading: Interim Report, lays out four options for complying with the Kyoto 
commitment.   The Interim Report examines a variety of technical, economic and political issues 
associated with each of these options.  This Memorandum addresses each of the Options in turn, and 
considers whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, each of these options appears likely to 
conflict with United States international trade obligations as set forth in the newly established Uruguay 
Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’).   A few preliminary 
observations may be useful in setting the stage for what follows. 
 
Preliminary Observations.  The analysis which follows focuses strictly on the WTO aspects of 
measures directly proposed in the Interim Report.  However, it should be recognized  that a scheme for 
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rationing emissions rights to domestic producers is not likely to stop there:  energy-intensive U.S. 
manufacturers are likely to respond to costly limits on carbon combustion and/or higher-priced electricity 
inputs by demanding either extension of the scheme to cover imported ‘like products’ or protection of 
domestic industry via cash subsidies, import surcharges, and/or export rebates.  (This political response 
by U.S. manufacturers will be exacerbated to the extent that foreign producers are not subject to any 
comparable requirements in their home markets; and attenuated to the extent they are.)   Any subsidies 
or border adjustments or restrictions granted in response to such demands would raise serious and 
difficult WTO issues, unless the WTO were itself clarified or amended to accommodate such measures.  
 
Second, the principal WTO concerns raised by the four options are subsidies concerns.  In 
analyzing the various options we will focus on detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the 
WTO Subsidies Agreement in light of  U.S. doctrine and practice interpreting and applying these 
provisions.   A focus on U.S. doctrine may be questioned since it is clear that the U.S. is not going to 
bring an action against its own practices.  However, I believe a focus on U.S. subsidies doctrine is 
necessary and appropriate, for the following reasons.  The Subsidies Agreement is only four years old, it 
is not a model of clarity, and only a handful of subsidies cases interpreting the Agreement  have been 
decided either by the WTO or in countries other than the United States.  I have found no authoritative 
travaux or negotiating history for the Agreement, nor have I found any subsequent WTO panel decisions 
or foreign countervailing duty decisions on point. [Can any readers of this draft help me on this?] 
Because the United States has brought the vast majority of countervailing duty cases decided since 1947 -
- initially under Articles VI and XVI of the 1947 WTO as clarified by the 1979 Subsidies Agreement and, 
since 1994, under the  Subsidies Agreement -- existing practice in the area of subsidies enforcement is 
largely the story of U.S. practice.  And because the United States has taken the position that the new 
Agreement largely codifies existing U.S. practice in most respects relevant to this discussion,1 we must 
anticipate that the United States is likely to be unwilling (or unable) to defend, in some hypothetical 
future dispute involving emissions trading, a position that contravenes the United States’ own previous 
doctrine and practice.    
Third, the United States is without question the most frequent and tight-fisted (some would say 
protectionist) enforcer of subsidies disciplines.  Only a handful of other countries have brought subsidies 
                                                 
     1See, e.g., United States Statement of Administrative Action at 255 (subsidy definition reflects U.S. practice) 
and 260-261 (specificity test reflects U.S. practice), reprinted in Applebaum at 231 and  237, respectively.  
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complaints and then only in a relative handful of cases.   Analyzing the Options in terms of WTO 
doctrine elucidated by United States practice thus provides a conservative estimate of litigation risk.  
 
Fourth, although WTO Article XX provides a limited exception from normal WTO disciplines for 
trade measures ‘necessary’ to protect human, animal or plant life or health (Art. XX(b)), or ‘relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ (Art. XX(g)), these exceptions are to the main WTO 1947 
Agreement.  WTO Article XX probably will be found not to qualify application of the Subsidies 
Agreement.  Unlike the 1979 Subsidies Agreement, the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement does not 
purport to be an interpretation of Articles VI and XVI of the 1947 WTO.  It is a separate and new 
agreement.   The ‘actionability’ of any scheme thus will depend on how it fares under the Subsidies 
Agreement standing alone. 
 
Finally, it bears mention that WTO is a legal regime, but it is also a political institution.  
Although the WTO has dealt harshly with ‘unilateral’ U.S. trade sanctions aimed at protecting the 
environment, it has dealt rather softly with trade measures adopted pursuant to multilateral environmental 
agreements.  Indeed, no challenge has yet been brought to trade measures adopted pursuant to CITES, 
the Basel Convention, or the ozone treaty, despite the technical vulnerability to challenge of trade 
measures employed under each of these conventions.   The climate treaty is among the most salient of 
international environmental agreements and bona fide climate change implementation measures are likely 
to benefit from an informal presumption in their favor.  However, this presumption will certainly be 
rebuttable by any showing of bright-line transgressions of WTO rules involving clear favoritism of 
particular firms or industries.    
 
The discussion of Option I will set forth the main contours of the WTO analysis which applies to 
all the options.  Having developed the relevant WTO legal analysis in discussion of Option I, we will 
then be in a position to build on that analysis in dealing more briefly with the remaining three. 
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OPTION I 
 
Option I consists of two main control strategies: (a) a tradable corporate average carbon 
emissions (CACE) standard for automobiles and a (possibly tradable) set of energy efficiency standards 
for refrigerators, air conditioners, building furnaces, and other electricity or fossil-fuel using equipment; 
and (b) a ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme covering ‘large stationary combustors.’  The permit scheme would cap 
aggregate emissions from facilities using boilers of greater than 100 million Btus/hour or consuming 
more than 1,000 tons of coal per year.  The cap would be set at 510 million tons of carbon (MtC) per 
year, distributed among covered sources according to each source’s pro rata share of carbon emissions in 
some baseline year, such as 1990.   Under the formula, it is expected that 375 MtC would be allocated to 
electricity generators.  The remaining 135 MtC would be allocated among a variety of industrial 
combustors that meet the ‘large source’ criteria: petroleum products and petrochemicals, basic organic 
and inorganic chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, paints, adhesives, soaps and cleaning 
compounds,  pulp and paper and paper products, resins, synthetic rubber and man-made fibers, primary 
metals, and cement, glass, bricks, lime and other stone and ceramic products.   New large sources (those 
constructed after the baseline year) would receive no permits.   Sources would be free to buy and sell 
permits as needed to support their operations, but all sources, new and old, would be required to hold one  
permit for every ton of carbon emitted, and that permit would be consumed by the emission of that ton.  
The permit scheme would cover only U.S. manufacturers.   Assuming, as the Interim Report does, that 
permits would be valued at $75 each, the total value of all permits issued to electricity generators and 
large industrial combustors would be $28 billion and $10 billion, respectively. 
 
Option I, like the other options, will confront permit recipients with three possible courses of 
action.  First, recipients may choose to continue U.S. manufacturing output up to at least the historic 
level of output, with only such reductions in output as are required by scarcity of emissions permits 
allocated to them or available for purchase at affordable prices (“continuation strategy”).  Second, permit 
recipients may elect to re-locate U.S. manufacturing facilities overseas (“diversion strategy”).   Re-
location of facilities overseas will generate surplus permits for recipients if, and to the extent that the 
option allows re-locating firms to continue to receive allocated permits in respect of baseline-year 
emissions of now-closed or downsized facilities.  Third, permit recipients may decide to exit their present 
industry altogether, in favor of less carbon-intensive or non-covered production (“exit strategy”).  Once 
again, exit will generate surplus permits for recipients if, and to the extent that, the option allows exiting 
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(or partially exiting) firms to continue to receive permits in respect of baseline-year emissions.  While 
Option I does not set forth explicit rules governing exit and diversion, conversations with drafters suggest 
that Option I as presently conceived would allow re-locating firms and exiting firms to continue to 
receive permits in respect of baseline-year emissions, at least for a period, say, five years. 
 
Option I appears to contemplate a purely domestic scheme of emissions rights and regulations 
which would not apply to imported goods.   The remaining discussion therefore assumes that imported 
goods would remain totally outside the process emissions cap-and-trade scheme (sub-option (b)), though 
they would need to conform to any product standards imposed under sub-option (a).  
 
WTO Analysis   
 
Product standards (sub-option (a)).   U.S. product standards imposing minimum mileage or 
energy efficiency requirements for products -- be they cars, trucks, refrigerators, or air conditioners -- are 
not likely to raise WTO concerns so long as they are crafted in a way that does not discriminate against 
imported products.   Moreover, it appears that the paramount concern is to avoid facial discrimination 
against foreign products.  A recent WTO dispute panel upheld a U.S. standards scheme closely 
analogous to the CACE – the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standard for automobiles – 
even though that scheme was implemented in a way that burdened foreign producers, de facto, much 
more heavily than their U.S. rivals.2    The only portion of the scheme rejected by the panel was a 
provision which established separate fleet averaging rules for domestic and foreign fleets -- a facial 
discrimination.  While the CAFE case certainly does not stand for the proposition that flagrant cases of 
de facto discrimination will never be struck down (and the CAFE decision itself will not bind future WTO 
dispute panels), the CAFE panel’s refusal to find a national treatment violation in the face of a fairly 
significant differential in regulatory impact (favoring domestic producers) suggests that the scrutiny given 
to facially neutral product standards is likely to be fairly lenient.   While it remains, as always, desirable 
to avoid differential and adverse impacts on imports, the key concern is to ensure that any standards do 
not facially discriminate between domestically-manufactured and imported goods.   
Large combustor cap-and-trade scheme (sub-option (b)).   The carbon emissions cap-and-
trade scheme set forth in sub-option (b) does not raise issues under the most favored nation and national 
                                                 
     2 General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade: United States -- Taxes on Automobiles, DS 31/R, Sept. 29, 1994.  
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treatment provisions of WTO Articles I and III, respectively, because it does not apply to imported 
products.  However, as discussed below, the provision of valuable emissions rights gratis to certain 
combustors could constitute ‘actionable’ subsidies under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement).3     
 
The Subsidies Agreement divides national practices into three categories: red light, green light, 
and other.  ‘Red light’ subsidies -- government subsidies that are contingent on export performance or 
use of domestic over imported goods -- are prohibited regardless of whether they are applied generally or 
to specific industries and regardless of whether they cause adverse economic effects or not.  See 
Subsidies Agreement, Art. 3.   ‘Green light’ subsidies are given an equally unqualified safe harbor from 
WTO discipline.  One of these categories of green lights subsidies involves ‘environmental subsidies,’ 
but the term is defined narrowly to cover only government assistance to promote adaptation of existing 
facilities to new environmental requirements provided that the assistance: (i) is a one-time non-recurring 
measure; and (ii) is limited to 20 percent of the cost of adaptation . . .   See Subsidies Agreement Art. 
8.2.  Since a yearly allotment of permits to domestic combustors sub-option (b) entails neither a 
(prohibited) export or import substitution incentive nor a (permitted) one-time environmental subsidy, no 
quick and easy analysis is available.  We must look more deeply. 
 
Under the Subsidies Agreement, a government practice is defined as a ‘subsidy’ if it is a 
‘financial contribution’ that confers a benefit.   (Art. 1)  A subsidy is actionable if it (a) confers a benefit 
upon ‘certain enterprises’ (i.e. a limited number and variety of enterprises and industries) and (b) causes 
‘injury to the domestic industry of another member’, ‘serious prejudice’ to the interests of another 
Member, or ‘nullification or impairment’ of tariff concessions made by the subsidizing Member.   
Actionable subsidies may trigger WTO dispute settlement proceedings leading to a WTO cease-and-desist 
recommendation (and possible retaliatory tariffs) if such subsidies cause ‘serious prejudice’ to the 
interests of another country in the subsidizing country’s own market or in a third-country market.  
Actionable subsidies also may trigger countervailing duties on U.S. exports if the national authority of the 
                                                 
     3If a complaint is brought in WTO dispute settlement it is conceivable, though not likely, that the program as a 
whole could be challenged facially as a violation of the Subsidies Agreement.   The more likely prospect is that 
Option I may challenged as applied to particular products or industries of concern to complainants.  In a foreign 
countervailing duty action, the scheme can only be challenged in terms of its application to products of the particular 
industries bringing a complaint in that country. 
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importing country finds that subsidized imports have caused or threaten ‘injury’ to a competing industry 
in that country.   (Arts. 2, 5, 6, 7, 11).   The key elements to be analyzed, therefore, are (a) financial 
contribution, (b) benefit, (c) specificity, and (d) injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice.  
 
Financial contribution    
Article 1.1 of the Subsidies Agreement states:  
For purposes of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of 
a Member (referred to in this Agreement as ‘government’) i.e. where: 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
 . . .  
and 
 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.  
 
An argument that permits are ‘financial contributions’ could rest on either of two analytical 
foundations.  The first is the broad view of ‘financial contribution’ adopted by the United States in its 
long-standing countervailing duty practice, and in its Uruguay Round bargaining position, implementing 
legislation and accompanying Statement of Administrative Action (SAA).  United States practice 
construes the term ‘financial contribution’ to encompass any “formal, enforceable measure which directly 
led to a discernible benefit being provided to the industry under investigation.”4  In Certain Fasteners 
from India: Final Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, the Commerce 
Department concluded, in dicta, that an Indian tradable permit scheme -- which gave exporters special 
licenses to import goods to replenish stocks of imported inputs – would have been countervailable (had it 
been used) because the permits were negotiable and hence had market value and conferred a benefit on 
the recipient.  Even purely regulatory measures -- such as Canada’s ban on the export of unprocessed 
logs and Argentina’s restriction on exports of unprocessed hides -- have been deemed indirect subsidies  
to domestic processors in those countries.  Any definition of subsidy broad enough to sweep in Canadian 
log export restrictions and Indian import licensing schemes is likely to sweep in U.S. tradable emissions 
permits as well. 
 
                                                 
     4SAA at 926.  
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The breadth of this interpretation may, perhaps, be questioned.5   There is, however, a 
second basis for characterizing permits as financial contributions.  It is the simpler, narrower one that 
permits are negotiable legal instruments which have clear and measurable monetary value, and their 
transfer to certain recipients is like, if not identical to, a ‘direct transfer of funds.’  Few would dispute 
that the concept of ‘funds’ is broad enough to include stocks, bonds, options, derivatives, and other legal 
instruments which, when sold, yield cash.   Are all permits therefore financial contributions? 
 
There is, in my view, a viable distinction between tradable permits that are needed to meet 
regulatory requirements and ‘funds.’  Unlike stocks, bonds, etc., emissions permits issued under Option I 
would be coupled with a regulatory requirement that requires each source to limit yearly carbon emissions 
to a  level that corresponds to the number of permits held.  Companies who wish to continue to operate 
cannot sell all their permits for cash.  Only ‘surplus’ permits may be sold for cash.  Non-surplus permits 
do not ‘compensate’ facilities for emissions reductions requirements (as in classic environmental 
subsidies); they simply calibrate the degree of emissions reduction that is required.  They are a regulatory 
mechanism; not a compensatory scheme.  
 
What of the fact that Option I would award gratis permits to existing facilities and none at all to 
new ones?  Does this prove that new facilities are expected to achieve zero emissions such that any 
award of permits to existing plants is ‘really’ a compensatory scheme and a subsidy per se?   The only 
reasonable answer in my view is no, Option I clearly does not contemplate that any fossil-fuel facility will 
operate at zero emissions.  All facilities will need permits to operate.  Existing facilities will receive 
some permits free; new facilities will not.  This does not prove that all permits issued to existing facilities 
are a ‘financial contribution’; it merely proves that Option I discriminates against new sources.   Nothing 
                                                 
     5The Administration’s interpretation -- that a subsidy will be found in any regulation leading to a 
discernible benefit to a domestic industry -- is so broad as to essentially read the requirement for a 
‘financial contribution’ right out of the Subsidies Agreement.   In fact, in Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 FR 22570 (May 28, 
1992),  Commerce defended its determination that Canada’s log export restrictions constituted an 
indirect subsidy to Canadian softwood lumber producers (via a depressed price of cut timber inputs) by 
noting, repeatedly, that the Subsidies Code definition of subsidy (pre-Uruguay Round) did not require a 
‘financial contribution.’  After the Uruguay Round, the new Subsidies Agreement does require a 
financial contribution, in so many words, yet Commerce takes the position that that makes no difference: 
all regulatory practices that confer benefits are subsidies anyway!   
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in the WTO Agreement prohibits discriminating against new sources on a national treatment basis.  In 
fact, U.S. environmental laws have “discriminated against” new sources for decades, by imposing higher 
environmental standards on them than are imposed on existing sources, without ever triggering a WTO 
challenge. 
 
Thus, the better view is that ‘surplus’ permits – and only surplus permits – constitute a financial 
contribution.  The fact that the government never intentionally awards ‘surplus’ permits is immaterial.6  
Likewise, the fact that permits are issued at no cost to the government is immaterial: the Subsidies 
Agreement clearly confirms the long-standing U.S. position that benefit to the recipient, not cost to 
government, is the touchstone of a subsidy.   Here, recipients benefit by at least the amount (and value) 
of saleable surplus permits received at no cost from the government.   
 
Benefit 
 
Under the Subsidies Agreement, a subsidy exists if a financial contribution is made and a ‘benefit 
is thereby conferred.’7   This use of the passive voice lends independent credence to the view that 
benefits accruing indirectly from financial contributions (here, by reducing emissions and selling surplus 
permits) are nonetheless benefits.8  It has been seen that the amount of the benefit is likely to be 
measured by the market value of ‘surplus’ permits awarded to each enterprises covered facilities.    
Two important features of the benefit calculation bear special mention.  First, the benefit is not 
likely to be offset further by the cost of reducing emissions to the level necessary to generate the surplus. 
The fact that a subsidy is received as partial compensation for higher fuel costs and/or fuel conversion 
costs or other regulatory compliance costs is irrelevant to the determination of whether a subsidy exists or 
                                                 
     6See Subsidies Agreement Article 1.1 (quoted above). 
     7Subsidies Agreement Art. 1.1(b).  This phrase puts to rest a long-standing dispute within WTO about 
whether subsidies should be defined and measured on the basis of cost to government or, alternatively, 
benefit to recipient.  At least in cases where a financial contribution is provided, the U.S. position, 
favoring benefit to the recipient as the litmus test of subsidy, has triumphed. 
     8This use of the passive voice undermines the defense that government issuance of salable permits confers no 
benefit because any revenues from such permits must be earned by reducing emissions over and above the allocated 
amount in order to generate a surplus for sale.  Under the Subsidies Agreement, it is not necessary that the 
government contribute a benefit.  It is only necessary that the government contribute something, and that a benefit 
is thereby conferred.  
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the calculation of the subsidy margin.  With the one (inapplicable) exception of permissible 
environmental subsidies described above, the Subsidies Agreement treats subsidies for regulatory 
compliance just like any other subsidy.9   Second, the margin of benefit is not likely to be diminished (or 
augmented) by the way the recipients use the subsidy.  It simply will not matter whether or to what 
degree the receiving companies use the subsidy to lower prices and gain competitive advantage, or 
whether they simply return the subsidy as rent to employees, management, or shareholders.10   Benefit 
will be measured by the market value of surplus permits conferred on each enterprise, full stop.   This 
total benefit will be divided by the total yearly sales of the products benefitting from the subsidies, to 
yield an ad valorem subsidy rate (‘subsidy margin’).   Subsidies that are not earmarked for particular 
products would be allocated over the firm’s entire product sales.11   
 
The Subsidies Agreement provides a safe harbor from countervailing duties for de minimis 
subsidies,  i.e., subsidies margins of  less than 1 percent ad valorem.12  
                                                 
     9See Commerce Department, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Feb. 26, 1997, 62 FR 8818 (a subsidy that 
reduces a firm’s cost of compliance with a regulation remains a subsidy even though the overall effect of the two 
government actions, taken together, may leave the firm with higher costs). 
     10Canada has maintained that ‘benefit’ should be measured not in terms of the monetary value of the 
contribution, but in accordance with the competitive advantage derived thereby.  This argument would reduce the 
benefit by the portion of each contribution which was not used to cut prices or expand market share, but was simply 
internalized as ‘rent’, i.e. retained as earnings, paid out to employees or dividended to shareholders.  Distributions 
disposed of in this way arguably do not ‘distort markets’ and therefore should not be counted as ‘benefit.’  
Applying pre-Uruguay Round subsidies doctrine, Canada persuaded a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational 
Review Panel (divided perfectly along national lines) to require Commerce to apply a market distortion analysis in 
the appeal of the Commerce Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination in Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada.  Commerce followed orders in that case, but the United States has not accepted the general 
proposition.   In its recent Uruguay Round implementing legislation and Statement of Administrative Action, the 
Clinton Administration reiterated its view that market impact should not be considered in determining whether a 
subsidy has been provided.  Moreover, nothing in the text of Article 1 of the Subsidies Agreement supports, much 
less requires, Canada’s market distortion analysis. 
 
     11See Subsidies Agreement, Annex IV.  
     12See Subsidies Agreement, Art. 11.9.  While, the Subsidies Agreement provides that benefits to any enterprise 
in excess of 5 percent ad valorem will be deemed to cause serious prejudice per se  (Article 6), Annex IV of the 
Agreement stipulates that the 5 per cent subsidy calculation is to be determined on the basis of “cost to the granting 
government.”  Since emissions permits are costless to the government, the 5 percent threshold is inapplicable to our 
case.  However, firms using subsidies to ‘start up’ new lines of production are deemed to cause serious prejudice 
pre se if the overall rate of subsidization in the first year of production exceeds 15 percent of the total funds invested 
in the start-up.  See Subsidies Agreement, Annex IV. 
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Option I will bestow ‘surplus’ permits principally upon (1) firms continuing to operate facilities 
that enjoy significant fuel-switching and/or other emissions reduction options; and (2) firms that close (or 
radically downsize) facilities whose baseline-year emissions generate a continuing stream of permits.   
Facility closure or downsizing might be done in order to exit the covered activity altogether (exit 
strategy), or in order to re-locate covered facilities overseas (diversion strategy).    With regard to firms 
and facilities continuing to operate at or above historic levels of output, it is significant that the Option I 
cap-and-trade scheme assigns permits to individual manufacturing sources on the basis of historic 
emissions, not on the basis of future emissions reduction potential.  This allocation method increases the 
likelihood -- though it by no means assures -- that certain firms or industries (e.g. historic coal combustors 
blessed with inexpensive fuel switching options) will garner non-de-minimis levels of surplus permits and 
subsidies.  From a subsidies perspective, a more refined permit allocation formula based on estimates of 
average future reduction potential of classes and categories of sources (rather than historic emissions) 
would be preferred.  
 
The prospect of plant closures (or downsizings) in response to Option I raises more difficult 
subsidies issues.    As mentioned, such plant closings might occur either in connection with a firm’s 
exit/partial exit from a high-carbon line of manufacturing, or in connection with the re-location of a 
covered manufacturing facility overseas, presumably to an unregulated jurisdiction.   If plant 
closure/downsizing causes forfeiture of the associated stream of permits, no subsidies issues arise.  If, 
however, Option I is implemented under a rule that allows plant closing firms to retain their entitlement to 
the permit stream generated by the closed facility, then it is clear that the receiving firm could receive a 
significant, on-going subsidy in the form of stream of surplus permits that are salable for cash.   Such a 
result might – provided the other conditions of actionable subsidy are met – trigger a subsidies challenge 
from foreign manufacturers of competing products.  More likely, such an outcome (or the prospect of it) 
might trigger strong political opposition in the United States, where critics would charge that Option I 
rewards and encourages U.S. manufacturers to close U.S. facilities in order to generate unencumbered, 
salable permits.   They would say that whether closure leads to exit of that firm from the industry or 
merely re-location of the firm’s manufacturing overseas, the perverse result is the same: domestic 
production is replaced by imports, U.S. jobs are lost, and (since foreign facilities also release greenhouse 
gases) global carbon emissions are simply displaced, not reduced.   How likely is the exit/re-location 
response in practice?    Microeconomic responses to policy stimuli are notoriously hard to model or 
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predict; in any case, such an empirical question lies well outside this paper’s scope.   To the extent the 
exit and re-location scenarios are deemed credible, they need to be addressed in the design of Option I.   
They may argue for some limitation (perhaps time limits) on the eligibility of  firms to continue to 
receive permits in respect of historic production from closed facilities. 
 
The special case of upstream subsidies.   The allocation formula contemplated by Option I 
would bestow a major share of annual issue of permits on fossil-fuel (especially coal-fired) electric 
utilities.  Many of these utilities will have options for converting from coal/oil to natural gas, thereby 
creating the potential for such utilities to reduce substantially their use of permits per unit of electricity 
output.  This will tend to create surplus permits.  On the other hand, such utilities are likely to face a 
much higher demand for electricity in the allocation year (2008) than they faced in the baseline year 
(1990).  This will tend to shrink the availability of surplus permits by forcing utilities to use permits 
released by coal-gas conversion to support expanded power output.   Therefore, I am unable to predict 
whether, on balance, electric utilities (particularly coal-fired electric utilities) will generate sizable 
volumes of surplus permits in practice. 
 
If this group of powerplants does generate significant surpluses, an upstream subsidies issue 
could arise.  Although electric utilities do not produce anything that moves directly in international trade, 
they do sell power to manufacturing facilities.  If the power is deemed subsidized, the downstream 
product manufactured with the input of that power would be deemed to have received an ‘upstream 
subsidy.’   Moreover, electric utilities will receive the lion’s share of permits under Option I and 
subsidies to utilities almost certainly will be found to be ‘specific’ on the basis of the disproportionate use 
specificity rule.  An upstream subsidy that is deemed specific to the electric utility sector (see analysis 
below) would be regarded as per se specific to all downstream buyers of electricity, regardless of their 
diversity. 
 
Under long-standing Commerce practice (unmodified by the Uruguay Round), an upstream 
subsidy is defined as any subsidy that (1) is paid on an input product; (2) bestows a competitive 
advantage on the downstream product; and (3) has a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing the 
downstream product.13    As the SAA clarifies, subsidies on upstream products are only considered 
                                                 
     13See Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada, 62 FR 5201, download p. 4 (February 4, 1997).   
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upstream subsidies to the extent they are passed through to the downstream product and have a significant 
effect on the cost of manufacturing that downstream product.14  I am not aware of any reason to suppose 
that other countries would analyze the case differently.   
 
It is, of course, most unlikely that Option I would result in a lowering of electricity prices to 
customers compared to pre-Option I status quo.   That is not the baseline for measuring the benefit to 
downstream users, however.  Benefit will be measured on the basis of an estimate of what the price of 
electricity to customers would have been without the bestowal of surplus permits on certain utilities. This 
price differential will be multiplied by total power supplied per year, to yield an overall yearly benefit.   
This benefit will then divided pro rata among all utility customers according to their respective power 
usage, unless there is some reason to believe that the utility is giving special price breaks to favored 
customers.   This is the estimate of benefit that will be used to determine whether the upstream subsidy 
has had a significant effect on input costs and provided a competitive advantage to the recipient firms.  
Again, it is impossible to predict with certainty what this analysis will yield. 
 
Specificity 
 
Recognizing that governments exist to provide goods and services which confer a benefit, and not 
wishing to define everything the government does as a subsidy, the Subsidies Agreement disciplines only 
subsidies that are ‘specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.’  (Art. 1.2).    
Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement states: 
 
In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as 
‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles 
shall apply: 
 
(a)  Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority 
operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be 
specific. 
 
(b)  Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority 
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and 
amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic 
                                                 
     14SAA at 270, reprinted in Applebaum at 246. 
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and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to.  The criteria or conditions 
must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official documents so as to be 
capable of verification.15 
 
 
Article. 2.1, note 2.  Such are the guidelines for de jure specificity.   Recognizing that facially neutral 
criteria may conceal targeting of specific industries or enterprises, by intention or effect, the Agreement 
adds the following on  de facto specificity:  
 
(c)    If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of 
the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the 
subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered.  Such factors are: (1) 
use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, (2) predominant 
use by certain enterprises, (3) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of a 
subsidy to certain enterprises, and (4) the manner in which discretion has been exercised 
by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. [enumeration added] 
 
 
Any determination of specificity must be ‘clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.’ (Art. 
2.4).   The Administration has claimed, plausibly, that the language quoted above largely codifies prior 
U.S. doctrine and practice.16  Thus, the issues is whether the Option I award of surplus permits to large 
fossil fuel combustors would constitute a subsidy that is either de jure or de facto specific. 
 
De jure specificity.  Clearly, a subsidy program that benefits every industry in the economy is not 
specific, while a subsidy program which is restricted by law to a single enterprise or industry is de jure 
specific.  The difficulty arises from intermediate cases such as ours, where the beneficiaries are likely to 
be numerous and span several industry groupings, while falling far short of covering the entire economy 
or even the entire manufacturing sector.  Unfortunately, it turns out that the law on specificity is a study 
in vagueness.  Under U.S. practice, a subsidy is de jure specific only if the government ‘expressly limits 
                                                 
     15A footnote to this clause explains: “Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or 
conditions which are neutral, which do not favor certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature 
and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of enterprise.”     
 
     16SAA at 260-261, reprinted in Applebaum at 236-237.  There is one area where U.S. law appears to diverge 
from the Agreement.  U.S. law ‘clarifies’ that Commerce shall find de facto specificity under sub-paragraph (c) 
above (actually, its U.S. law counterpart) if any one or more of the four factors above ‘exist.’ 19 U.S.C.A. § 
1677(5A)(D)(iii).    The Subsidies Agreement, as seen above, does not support the sufficiency of any one factor. 
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access to a subsidy to a sufficiently small number of enterprises, industries, or groups of industries.’17   
Both the Subsidies Agreement and U.S. countervailing duty law, however, are intentionally vague on the 
concept of  ‘sufficiently small.’  The Uruguay Round SAA observes: 
 
As under existing law, clause (i) [of U.S. implementing legislation which tracks clause (a) of 
Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement] does not attempt to provide a precise mathematical formula 
for determining when the number of enterprises or industries eligible for a subsidy is sufficiently 
small so as to be properly considered specific.  A proposal to establish such quantitative criteria 
was made during the Uruguay Round and was quickly rejected by the United States and many 
other participants.  Commerce can only make such determinations on a case-by-case basis.18  
 
Moreover, the vagaries of the term ‘sufficiently small’ are compounded by the definitional 
problems.  In any universe of subsidy users one can find many ‘industries’ -- or only a few (or one) -- 
depending on how ‘industry’ or ‘group’ of industries/enterprises is defined.19   Under U.S. law, the basic 
definition of ‘industry’ is clear enough from the statute:  it means ‘the producers as a whole of a domestic 
like product or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major 
proportion of the total domestic production of the product.’  19 U.S.C. 1677(4).  ‘Like product’ 
determinations, while frequently contested at the margins, are basically familiar to practitioners and  
Option I clearly would make permits available to producers of a very wide variety of ‘like products.’   
The definitional problem arises from section (5A) of the U.S. countervailing duty law, which adds a 
kicker: “For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (5B), any reference to an enterprise or industry is a 
reference to a foreign enterprise or foreign industry and includes a group of such enterprises or 
industries.” (italics added).    
 
The word ‘group’ is statutorily undefined 20 and Commerce has expressly rejected the SIC or 
ISIC classification approach to defining ‘group’ (or at least rejected the notion that there is any 
                                                 
     17SAA at 260, reprinted in Applebaum at 236.   
     18SAA at 260, reprinted in Applebaum at 260. 
     19For example, in Certain Softwood Lumber Commerce saw only two industries using stumpage.  The 
Canadian defendants, using a different approach to defining ‘industry,’ saw ‘twenty-seven different industries’ using 
stumpage.  Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel 
Review (December 17, 1993), at 46.   
     20The Subsidies Agreement offers no guidance as to the meaning of either ‘industry’ or ‘group.’  Article 2 of 
the Subsidies Agreement does not even use these words, preferring the equally enigmatic term ‘certain enterprises.’  
 
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM) 
Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute16 
requirement for such an approach), without offering any alternative ex ante approach.   Commerce has 
even rejected the notion that a  ‘group’ of industries must share common characteristics in order to be 
called a group.21  Absent any governing criteria for defining a ‘group’, it would appear that Commerce 
has retained broad discretion to define the term on a case by case basis.22   If other countries choose 
equally ad hoc approaches in  their countervailing duty practice, then foreign administering authorities 
will have very broad scope to either countervail or exonerate U.S. tradable permit programs as they wish 
(at least insofar as the specificity test is concerned).23  Likewise, the Subsidies Agreement states that a 
subsidy is de jure specific if only ‘certain’ enterprises are eligible, but offers no clear guidance as to how 
the word ‘certain’ is to be interpreted and applied in practice. 
 
Suppose, next, that the eligibility for subsidy is determined, not by list, but by criteria: e.g., all 
producers emitting more than  ‘X’ tons of greenhouse gases per year.  Sub-paragraph (b) suggests that 
eligibility criteria expressed in ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ terms should escape de jure specificity, provided 
the criteria were clearly spelled out in law or regulation, and do not favor ‘certain enterprises’ over others.   
But what does it mean not to ‘favor certain enterprises over others’?   All eligibility criteria inherently 
favor those firms that meet the criteria, and disfavor those that do not.  The operative words appear to be 
‘certain enterprises’, which is WTO-speak for what the U.S. refers to as a ‘sufficiently small’ or narrow 
grouping as to justify a specificity finding.   Subsidies criteria drawn  to benefit ‘too few’ enterprises 
and/or industries will be deemed to favor ‘certain enterprises.’  In the end, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
the Subsidies Agreement boil down to essentially the same de jure specificity test: whether the number of 
enterprises and/or industries legally eligible for a government subsidy  is ‘sufficiently small’ (or non-
diverse) to justify a specificity finding.  We are back to the same definitional conundrum.  All we can do 
is examine a few precedents to try to give readers a ‘feel’ for how this subjective determination of 
specificity would be made.  
                                                 
     21Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992), download at 23A. 
     22For example, in PPG v. United States (PPG I), 928 F.2d. 1568 (CAFC 1991) Commerce was invited by 
domestic petitioners to define a group of ‘energy intensive’ industries in Mexico to support a finding that natural gas 
subsidies furnished disproportionately to such a ‘group’ of users constituted a specific subsidy.  To its credit, 
Commerce declined; but, significantly, Commerce could not articulate any principled reason for doing so. 
     23A second source of uncertainty arises from the fact that Commerce seldom explains its specificity findings in 
much detail, and seldom articulates exactly how many and which firms or ‘industries’ (as defined by Commerce) are 
eligible for subsidies in particular cases.   
 
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM) 
Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute17 
 
Commerce has held that subsidies made formally available to all ‘agricultural’ producers are not 
de jure specific,24 but subsidies limited to horticulture and greenhouse industries are specific (though 
these two ‘industries’ span more than 60 categories of products).25   Similarly, in its re-determination 
after an initial binational panel remand in Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Commerce found that 
stumpage subsidies made available to the ‘pulp and paper’ and ‘wood products’ industries were specific 
even though 3,600 enterprises in these industries (accounting for 2.5 - 4 % of all enterprises in Canada) 
actually used the stumpage and their products accounted for 9 percent of all commodities manufactured in 
Canada.26  A bi-national U.S.-Canada FTA dispute panel (split perfectly along national lines) disagreed 
and ordered Commerce to find the stumpage subsidies non-specific.  As the panel noted, Commerce had 
previously found that Mexican users of natural gas comprising only 3.5 percent of all Mexican companies 
were non-specific (though they arguably spanned a larger number of different ‘industries’); and ‘counsel 
for Commerce could refer to no case in which Commerce has found a group of users covering the 
equivalent of three 2-digit SIC codes to be ‘too few.’‘27   What emerges from these examples is an 
interplay between enterprise number and industry variety in de jure specificity determinations.  Hundreds 
of beneficiaries may be considered ‘too few’ if they are concentrated in one or two industries.  The same 
number of eligible beneficiaries (or a smaller number) may be considered non-specific if they range 
across a wide variety of different industries.28    
 
                                                 
     24Live Swine from Canada, 59 FR 12243 (March 16, 1994), download p. 8. 
     25Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992), download p. 25. 
     26What appears to have persuaded Commerce of the specificity of these subsidies was not the number of 
enterprise beneficiaries,  but the fact that only two ‘industries’ benefitted. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel Review (December 17, 1993), download pp. 10-14. 
     27Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel Review 
(December 17, 1993), download pp. 14, 16, 19. 
     28See, e.g. PPG Industries v. United States, 978 F.2d. 1232, 1241 (CAFC 1992) (holding that although the 
actual number of eligible firms must be considered, it is not controlling.  Instead, the actual make-up of eligible 
firms must also be considered.  A relatively small number of eligible firms will be considered non-specific if they 
span a wide variety of industries); for the converse proposition, recall Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 FR 22570 (May 28, 1992) (holding that fact that 
3500 firms actually use subsidy program is not dispositive where firms are limited to two industry sectors).   
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With these caveats, it should be noted that I have found no clear precedents in U.S. or WTO 
practice where nominal subsidy eligibility extended as widely as is contemplated in Option I has been 
found to be de jure specific.29  Option I applies very broadly on its face, and it seems unlikely that foreign 
governments would choose a good faith climate change compliance measure to push the legal envelope in 
finding the program de jure specific.   
 
The greater danger lies in the area of de facto specificity. 
 
De facto specificity.  If the program is de jure specific, that is the end of the specificity analysis.  
If, however, the program is found to be  not de jure specific, then the administering authority must 
further determine whether the program is de facto specific, applying sub-paragraph (c) of the Subsidies 
Agreement.  Four factors inform this analysis: 
 
Pursuant to section 771(5A)(5)(D)(iii) of the Act [i.e. Uruguay Round implementing legislation] a 
subsidy is de facto specific if one or more of the following four factors exists:  (1) the number of 
enterprises, industries or groups thereof which use a subsidy is limited; (2) there is predominant 
use of a subsidy by an enterprise, industry, or group; (3) there is disproportionate use of a subsidy 
by an enterprise, industry, or group; (4) the manner in which the authority providing a subsidy has 
exercised discretion indicates than an enterprise or industry is favored over others.30 
 
In U.S. practice, Commerce examines the factors sequentially, though this is not required by the 
Subsidies Agreement text.  The first factor cannot be taken literally: all numbers of enterprises and 
industries are mathematically limited.  As explained in the SAA, where the number of enterprises or 
industries using a subsidy is ‘not large’ the first factor alone would justify a finding of specificity.  
Where the number is ‘very large’ then Commerce analyzes factors (2) and (3) together, looking for 
dominant or disproportionate use by enterprises or industries under investigation.  Factor (4) is accorded 
the least emphasis and typically is used only to clarify the analysis of the first three factors.31  But U.S. 
                                                 
     29[Are there cases where more narrowly drawn subsidies have been found de jure non-specific? ] 
     30Certain Laminated Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada: Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, 61 FR 59079,59082 (November 20, 1996). 
     31As the SAA explains, ‘The Administration intends to continue existing Commerce practice of according the 
least significance to the factor regarding the exercise of discretion.’  Recognizing that administering authorities are 
often required to exercise discretion in determining eligibility for all manner of government programs, the 
Administration has held that exercise of discretion is not of itself sufficient to establish specificity.  ‘The discretion 
factor would have more value in connection with an analysis of other de facto specificity criteria.’  SAA at 261, 
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law and practice is clear that specificity shall be found if any one of the first three factors exists.  Id.  
Commerce has expressly held that purposeful government targeting of a particular enterprise or industry 
need not be shown.32  The question is one of effect: whether a relatively few firms or industries receive a 
‘disproportionate’ share of subsides.  
 
Under Commerce practice, predominant or disproportionate use is determined by examining the 
investigated firms’ or industries’ share of total benefits actually disbursed under a subsidy.   Sometimes 
Commerce will try to put this ratio in perspective by comparing it to the share of production accounted for 
by firms or industries under investigation, as a proportion of production value of all ‘eligible’ firms.   If 
the investigated firms’ share of benefits is large, or if it is significantly larger than the investigated firms’ 
share of total production (with shares being measured by reference to the total universe of eligible 
participants), then Commerce is likely to find predominant use.   
 
A few examples may help to further clarify the interpretation of the de facto specificity test.  In 
Live Swine from Canada, Commerce found that where the universe of eligible users was over 80 
commodities, that was not de jure specific, but the fact that only 11-13 actually received benefits made 
the program de facto specific.33    
 
In Magnesium from Canada, the state-owned enterprise Hydro-Quebec sold electricity to eligible 
industrial customers under long-term contracts which tied electricity prices to fluctuations in customers’ 
profitability and prices.  Eligibility for this arrangement was limited to (1) capital intensive firms, (2) 
requiring at least five Megawatts of electricity, (3) for which energy represents a major factor in 
production costs (15 percent or more) and (4) for which energy costs constitute a major factor in choice of 
location.  Commerce did not find this program de jure specific, but did find de facto specificity because 
only 14 companies enrolled in the program while over 300 users were nominally eligible.34   
                                                 
reprinted in Applebaum at 237. 
     32Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992).  
     3359 FR 12243, March 16, 1994. 
     34Magnesium from Canada, 57 FR 30946, July 13, 1992. 
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In Dutch Flowers a subsidy program nominally available to all agricultural producers was found 
not de jure specific.  But the subsidies received by horticulture firms were deemed de facto specific 
because horticulture received 50 percent of the subsidy, while accounting for only 24 percent of Dutch 
agricultural production.35   
 
In Certain Steel Products from Belgium (Part IV) Commerce found that the respondent firms’s 
share of total disbursed benefits (17-20 %) was ‘disproportionate’ because it made the steel industry the 
‘largest single recipient.’36  Inasmuch as some industry will always the largest single recipient of any 
subsidy program, however widely disbursed, this reasoning must be considered dubious.    
 
In PPG I, however, Commerce declined to find de facto specificity despite a showing by 
petitioners that 9 companies accounted for more than 50 percent of all benefits disbursed under the 
program, and 23 companies got 60 percent.37  As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed 
of the same program challenged in a different case, ‘If only 60 percent of benefits are received by 23 
companies in varying industries, one can only imagine the number and variety of companies which 
received the remaining 40 percent of benefits.’38 
 
In our case, we have seen that ‘surplus’ permits are likely to be concentrated in two categories of 
firms:  (1) firms with historically high emissions coupled with significant, relatively low-cost reduction 
potential; and (2) firms exiting the industry or diverting manufacturing overseas (if they are allowed to 
keep receiving permits in respect of closed facilities).   Without knowing the number and diversity of 
firms that will comprise these categories, it is impossible to predict whether either or both would be 
considered ‘specific.’  All we can say with confidence at this point is that the more widely  distributed 
                                                 
     35Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands, 52 
FR 3301 (Feb. 3, 1987).  For a similar analysis, and result, see Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from the Republic of Korea, 49 FR 47284 (Dec. 3, 
1984).   
     36Certain Steel Products from Belgium (Part IV), 58 FR 37273, July 9, 1993, 
     37This finding was reported and upheld in PPG Industries v United States, 746 F.Supp.119 (CIT Aug. 9, 1990). 
     38PPG II, 978 F.2d 1232 (CAFC 1992). 
 
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM) 
Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute21 
the pattern of subsidy use under any program, the less likely it is that a future WTO panel or national 
administering authority will find it to be  de facto specific.  
 
Injury or serious prejudice 
 
Under the Subsidies Agreement, government-provided financial contributions that provide a 
benefit to ‘certain’ (read specific) enterprises are actionable if and only if they cause injury or serious 
prejudice to the interests of a competing industry (or group of industries) in another country.39  Recall 
that remedies to actionable subsidies may take the form of WTO dispute settlement, with respect to 
impacts in the exporting country or in third-country markets that cause or threaten ‘serious prejudice’; or 
national countervailing duty (CVD) actions with respect to impacts in the importing country that cause or 
threaten ‘injury.’   
 
With regard to national CVD determinations, Article 15 paragraph 1 (Paragraph 15.1) stipulates 
that determinations of injury are to be based on ‘positive evidence and involve an objective examination 
of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and the effect of subsidized imports on prices in the 
domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic 
producers of such products.’   Paragraph 15.2 clarifies that administering authorities should consider 
whether there has been ‘a significant increase in subsidized imports,’ or ‘significant price undercutting by 
subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product in the importing Member,’ or ‘whether 
the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree, or prevent price increases, 
which otherwise would have occurred.’  Paragraph 15.4 lists a host of factors relevant to the examination 
of the effect of subsidized imports in the importing country market.    
 
The analysis described in paragraphs 15.2 and 15.4 is directed to the effect of subsidized imports, 
not the effect of subsidies themselves.   The difference is important because subsidized imports could 
undercut prices, depress prices or capture market share in a foreign market for a wide variety of reasons 
that are totally unrelated to the effects of subsidies, or the magnitude of the subsidies conferred.  For 
many years prior to the Uruguay Round the United States took the position that ‘injury’ could be shown 
solely on the basis of the effects of subsidized imports, without regard to the magnitude or impact of the 
                                                 
     39See Subsidies Agreement, Articles 5, 6 and 15. 
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subsidies margins themselves.   Paragraph 15.5 of the Subsidies Agreement does not change that, 
although it seems to, at first glance.40    Therefore, U.S. manufacturers receiving surplus allowances that 
are found to be specific may face countervailing duty orders abroad if their exports to other markets cause 
‘injury’ to foreign producers of like products, regardless of whether the injury to competitors actually 
results from the value of the surplus permits received by U.S. firms.  The injury analysis becomes 
unpredictable from the standpoint of U.S. manufacturers and/or designers of tradable permits schemes. 
 
The serious prejudice analysis is likely to be more circumscribed.  Article 6 paragraph 2 of the 
Subsidies Agreement holds that ‘serious prejudice shall not be found if the subsidizing member 
demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects enumerated in paragraph 
3.’  The effects enumerated in paragraph 3 largely track the effects described in Article 15 (price 
undercutting, price depression, market share capture, etc) with one crucial difference: each of the 
objectionable effects mentioned in paragraph 15.3 must be attributable to ‘the effect of the subsidy,’ not 
the effect of subsidized imports.  Thus, the magnitude and effect of the subsidy does matter in serious 
prejudice cases.  Because the margin of subsidy is relevant to serious prejudice determinations, the 
likelihood of a serious prejudice finding can be minimized by measures (mentioned above) to minimize 
prospects of large accumulations of surpluses: (1) amending the allocation formula to reflect a ‘best 
guess’ of the average emissions reduction potential for various classes and categories of sources; and (2) 
implementing Option I under a rule which limits (perhaps time limits) the ability of firms to accrue 
permits in respect of closed or downsized manufacturing facilities.  
 
Option II 
 
Option II seeks near total coverage of carbon emissions within an administratively manageable 
cap and trade permit scheme.  It does this by requiring, and restricting, permits for the sale of all fuels – 
                                                 
     40The first sentence states that, ‘It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of 
subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.’  But the sentence is modified by a footnote which 
states ‘As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.’  As seen, these paragraphs deal exclusively with the effects of subsidized 
imports.  And the remainder of Paragraph 15.5 itself is devoted to a discussion of how the effects of subsidized 
imports should be examined.   It appears that the countries demanding greater attention to the magnitude and effect 
of subsidies in the injury analysis almost got their concerns addressed, but not quite.  Although the United States’ 
Statement of Administration Action is discretely silent on this nuance, no mention is made there or in the U.S. 
implementing legislation of any change in the U.S. approach, and I expect that U.S. doctrine and practice remains 
focused on the effect of subsidized imports, not the effect of subsidies themselves.  
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coal, oil and natural gas – that emit carbon when combusted, and by focusing the permit requirement on 
the narrowest points in the energy distribution chain.  Under Option II, permits would be auctioned 
(rather than given away) at the point of extraction for coal, refining for petroleum, and distribution for 
natural gas.  Permits would also be required for imports of refined petroleum products.  Suppliers 
wishing to conserve scarce permits would face an incentive under Option II to switch to less carbon 
intensive fuels/products.   All users of energy would encounter energy price increases (highest for more 
carbon-rich coal) that would encourage them to conserve fuel and/or switch to lower carbon fuels. 
 
The Interim Report does not specify how the permits will be calibrated in each case, or whether 
permits will be tradable across these four categories.   The Report notes in Appendix 3-1 that supply-side 
allocations (as in Options 2 and 3) could be based on carbon content of the fuel, the energy content, or ‘on 
a ‘performance’ metric, for example linking the allocation to a low carbon-content fuel standard’ such as 
natural gas.  Report at 3-45.  The chief advantage of energy content and performance based metrics – as 
I read Appendix 3-1 – is that they avoid advantaging high carbon coal producers in a scenario like Option 
III where permits are awarded free of charge on the basis of past carbon, or energy, or natural-gas 
equivalent carbon emissions.  Such variations would not seem to have any particular advantage in the 
context of auctioned permits, so I assume the preference under Option II would be for permits expressed 
in units of carbon content of fuel sold.41    
 
WTO Analysis 
 
 Subsidies issues seem unlikely to arise in this option since all permits are auctioned.  However, 
issues of national treatment could arise if the option is implemented in a way that discriminates against 
foreign products.   It is difficult to anticipate all the possible ways that ingenious national regulators 
and/or domestic producers might conceive to discriminate against foreign competitors.   Two obvious 
modes of discrimination present themselves, however:  (1) requiring fuel/petroleum product importers to 
hold permits at a different (probably earlier) stage of processing than applies to domestic producers 
                                                 
     41As the authors of the Interim Report are no doubt aware, the ‘carbon content’ of a ton of fuel sold does not 
bear a fixed correspondence to actual carbon emissions from combustion.  The latter depends significantly on the 
efficiency of the combustion process, which may vary dramatically depending on the nature, age, and sophistication 
of the combustion process used.  Since the details of later combustion cannot be known in advance at the point of 
supply, I assume that the administrators of Option II would base carbon-content calculations for permit purposes 
based on some ‘average’ or ‘modeled’ combustion scenario. 
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(without making appropriate adjustments), so that foreign producers have to purchase more permits per 
unit than their similarly situated domestic counterparts; or (2) calculating the carbon content of foreign 
fuels/products in a way that requires them to hold more permits per unit than similarly situated domestic 
producers.  Barring the exercise of such invidious ingenuity at the implementation stage, I see no WTO 
problems arising from Option II. 
 
Option III 
  
 Option III envisions a combination of (a) energy efficiency product standards for small sources 
(transport vehicles, residential and small commercial furnaces, air conditioning units, lighting fixtures and 
appliances) and (b) a cap-and-trade scheme covering fossil fuel producers, who would be required to hold 
one permit for each ton of carbon-equivalent energy sold.   The overall cap would be set at 1300 MtC 
per year, lowered by the amount deemed necessary for any set aside programs.  These 1300 million 
permits would be distributed each year among oil and gas producers (not refineries or pipelines), coal 
extractors and coal combustors.   The cap would be allocated to oil, gas and coal producers according to 
each producer’s pro rata share of carbon production in some base year such as 1990.42  Half of the coal 
producers’ allocation, however, would be diverted to large coal combustors based on their consumption in 
the base year.  Coal combustors would have no regulatory need for these permits and could sell (or trade) 
them back to their coal suppliers or, if they switch fuels, back to their oil and gas suppliers; or combustors 
could simply sell the permits on the open market.  The award of ‘freeby’ permits to coal combustors is 
intended to help compensate them for the cost of fuel switching and/or process re-design to minimize coal 
use. 
 
WTO Analysis 
 
Since Option III treats oil and gas producers, coal producers, and coal combustors separately, 
each requires a separate WTO analysis.   
 
                                                 
     42Alternatively, permits might be awarded according to each producer’s pro rata share of energy 
content, or natural-gas equivalent carbon content, thereby favoring oil and gas producers even more 
strongly.  See Interim Report, Appendix 3-1.   
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Treatment of oil and gas producers.   The treatment of oil and gas producers under Option III 
raises issues of national treatment and subsidies.  The United States imports a substantial portion of the 
oil and a small but growing fraction of its natural gas supply.  Article III of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1947 (incorporated in the WTO Agreement and referred to hereafter as ‘GATT”) 
requires that oil and gas imports receive national treatment in the allocation of permits, i.e., that they 
receive permits under the same formula that applies to domestic oil and gas unless some compelling 
policy justification can be advanced for distinguishing between foreign and domestic oil and gas.43  Since 
there are no real environmental reasons to distinguish between domestically-produced and imported oil 
and gas, the exceptions of GATT Article XX would not provide a basis for discrimination.  The national 
security exceptions of GATT Article XXI clearly would allow the United States to deny permits to Iran, 
Iraq and other pariah nations.  The United States has construed that article to authorize banning imports 
from these countries entirely.44   But the national security exception obviously would not justify 
discriminating against imports from ‘friendly’ countries. 
 
Does this present a political problem for Option III in the United States?   Not so long as foreign 
competitors continue to export fossil fuels to the United States up to the level of their allocated permits.   
It has long been understood that the national treatment obligation of the GATT extends to imported oil 
and gas.  The recent WTO decision in Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline re-
affirmed that principle and the United States’ willingness to amend its laws and regulations to conform to 
                                                 
     43A restriction on imported oil and gas would seem, at first blush, to more closely resemble a quantitative 
import restriction subject to GATT Article XI than an internal regulation covered by GATT Article III.  However, a 
well-known Note to Article III stipulates that “any law, regulation or requirement . . . which applies to an imported 
product and to the like domestic product and is . . . enforced in the case of the imported product at the time of 
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as . . . a law, regulation or requirement . . . subject to the provisions of 
Article III.”  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Note ad Article III, reprinted in, inter alia,  
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), para. 5.8.  
That clearly is the situation created by Option III, which aims to restrict overall sales of coal, oil and gas by 
domestic and foreign producers of fossil-fuel products.   
     44GATT Article XXI contains ‘security exceptions’ which provide legal cover for a wide range of foreign-
policy or security-based trade restrictions and discriminations that the United States has long maintained and 
continues to maintain against ‘enemy’ or ‘unfriendly’ states.   Pursuant to these exceptions, the United States can 
and would refuse to issue emissions permits to extractors based in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Libya, and the like.  
This would present no problem under GATT law. (Moreover, none of the extractors in these countries could have 
any baseline of exports into the United States that would justify an allocation, since these countries are subject to 
long-standing and comprehensive U.S. trade embargoes.) 
 
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM) 
Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute26 
that decision signals, I believe, a political acceptance in the United States that imported oil and gas, like 
other products, are entitled to national treatment under U.S. regulations.45 
 
A political hue and cry is likely to develop in the United States under Option III only if, or when, 
a foreign producer chooses a diversion or exit strategy -- reducing fossil fuel exports to the United States 
and taking revenues from the sale of now-surplus permits to cross-subsidize overseas production in other 
areas, say, cars, shoes or petrochemicals.46  At this point, U.S. producers of cars, shoes or petrochemicals 
will cry foul, saying that the U.S. government is indirectly subsidizing foreign competition at the expense 
of the American energy consumer (whose supplier is forced to absorb the cost of buying the surplus 
permits).   Should such a scenario develop, the Administration would come under strong domestic 
political pressure to curtail issuance of permits to foreign firms who fail to use them to cover exports to 
the United States.   
 
There are two ways to resolve this dilemma (should it materialize) on terms consistent with 
GATT/WTO. The first is simply to ban the cross-subsidization of all products, foreign or domestic, using 
revenues derived from the sale of surplus permits.47   However, such a rule would limit the economic 
                                                 
     45See World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).  
     46What is a ‘foreign’ enterprise, for purposes of understanding the domestic politics of cross-subsidies?  
Clearly, U.S.-owned firms that manufacture in the United States are domestic, and foreign-owned (particularly state-
owned) firms that manufacture abroad -- such as Petroleos de Mexico (PEMEX) or Petroleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA) -- figure as purely ‘foreign’ firms in the U.S. political process.   The gray area consists of principally 
U.S.-owned and managed firms (like Exxon) who elect to set up a manufacturing operation overseas, and 
traditionally foreign-owned and managed firms (like British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell) who have a large 
presence in the United States.  Does national identity in the U.S. political process follow ownership or place of 
manufacture?   The question is a hard one.  The discussion that follows assumes that national identity will follow 
ownership: i.e., that Congress will not begrudge surplus permits to Exxon even if that company applies some of the 
revenues towards  setting up a manufacturing plant in Indonesia.   I leave open the possibility that firms such as 
BP and Shell that have a large U.S. presence might also be defined as ‘domestic’ firms for subsidies eligibility 
purposes.  Since the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement) incorporates 
GATT Article III by reference, and since GATT Article III contains a subsidies exception, it appears that the 
TRIMS Agreement would not preclude the United States from conditioning ‘domestic’ status for subsidies purposes 
on an agreement by a recipient firm to apply the proceeds from sale of surplus permits exclusively to U.S. 
manufacturing operations.    
     47The ban would apply to all producers, foreign and domestic.  It would be enforced not by WTO cases or 
countervailing duty actions, but simply by denying future permit allocations to any company found in violation of 
the ban.   Evidentiary problems would not arise since companies wishing to continue to receive future allocations 
of permits would have to agree to open their books to verify compliance with the cross-subsidy ban.   GATT 
national treatment obligations would be respected since foreign and domestic energy producers would be treated 
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incentives for companies to exit (or partially exit) from high-carbon activities -- even though exit (or 
partial exit) is the environmentally preferred result.  
 
The second way to deal with the political problem of appearing to ‘subsidize’ foreign suppliers (if 
the problem arises) is simply to allow U.S. fossil fuel suppliers, but not foreign suppliers, to sell ‘surplus’ 
permits.   Foreign suppliers would be subject to a use-or-lose rule in respect of permits issued them.   
There is some risk that a WTO panel would regard this as a facial discrimination that violates GATT 
Article III.  The better view, however, is that the issuance of free permits not needed to meet regulatory 
requirements is, in essence, an indirect subsidy on U.S. oil and gas firms leaving high-carbon activities.  
‘Discrimination’ against foreign suppliers is simply a way of limiting the benefit of the subsidy to U.S. 
companies.  GATT Article III.8(b) explicitly exempts subsidies from national treatment requirements. 
 
In practice, oil and gas producers could generate large surpluses only by reducing sales in the 
United States market below their baseline-year levels.   Given that coal conversion is likely to increase 
the demand for oil and gas, why would any profit-maximizing oil and gas company choose to reduce its 
U.S. sales?  Mainly because, under Option III as written, every unit of oil/gas that was sold by a 
company in the allocation baseline year generates one permit a year, in perpetuity, for the selling 
company.  If the corresponding unit of oil and gas is diverted overseas in the allocation year, that 
generates a subsidy -- in the form of a one free, salable permit each year -- for the diverting oil and gas 
company.   Given this incentive, oil and gas companies with historic U.S. sales almost certainly will 
choose to divert some traditional U.S. supplies of oil and gas to overseas markets.  That diversion will 
create a price-spike of oil and gas in the United States which will either lure in new suppliers who will 
buy permits to meet the demand, or reduce the incentive for historic suppliers to divert.  Eventually, 
supply and demand will equilibrate at a U.S. price which equals the overseas price of oil and gas plus the 
market value of the associated permits.   From the standpoint of U.S. oil and gas consumers, Option III 
will be identical to Option II in terms of energy price impact: unit energy prices will increase by the full 
amount of the cost of purchasing the corresponding permits.   But the revenues that would go to the 
                                                 
identically. Cross-subsidization of low-carbon energy products using revenues from sale of surplus permits would be 
allowed because (1) it furthers the environmental purpose of encouraging a transition from high-carbon to low-
carbon fuels, and (2) barring any cross-subsidization would undermine the compensatory purpose of an exit rule that 
allows firms leaving an energy industry to go on receiving surplus permits (see discussion above). 
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government under Option II’s auction system will be lavished on historic oil and gas suppliers as 
subsidies under Option III.   
 
Few foreign countries are likely to complain of receiving subsidized oil and gas from the United 
States or erstwhile U.S. suppliers.   But the U.S. political opposition to such a scheme could be 
considerable, and WTO subsidies issues could arise if oil and gas companies use revenues from the sale 
of surplus permits to ‘cross-subsidize’ other manufactured products into which those companies diversify: 
indirect subsidies are subsidies.  One way to avoid this result is to craft an anti-diversion rule for Option 
III: e.g. reduce each oil and gas firm’s entitlement to ‘surplus’ permits (permits in excess of allocation-
year U.S. oil and gas sales) by the amount of any increase in that firm’s overseas sales of oil and gas in 
the allocation year (or increase above a certain level) compared to the baseline year. 
 
Treatment of coal extractors.  U.S. imports of coal are very small currently (.18 Quads in 1995) 
but growing.  As discussed above in connection with oil and gas producers, GATT Article III requires 
that any pro rata allocation of permits to domestic producers must extend to foreign coal extractors as 
well.  The only permissible distinction between domestic and foreign coal producers is that foreign coal 
producers could be subject to a use-or-lose requirement, i.e., denied access to salable ‘surplus’ permits.   
This, however, would raise subsidies issues which this section will explore. 
 
Coal extractors will face three adverse impacts under Option III: (1) the overall number of 
permits allocable to the coal sector in aggregate will fall well short of what is needed to support historic 
levels of sales (with the magnitude of the shortfall dependent on whether permits are awarded on a 
carbon, energy, or ‘performance’ basis); (2) over half of the limited number of permits allocable to the 
coal sector will be given to combustors instead of extractors; and (3) coal combustors will have large 
incentives to switch fuels, contributing to a reduced customer base for coal.   Faced with these 
incentives, some coal suppliers doubtless will remain in business to supply customers (such as steel and 
cement) whose processes leave them few attractive alternatives to coal.  However, the dominant response 
of U.S. coal extractors to Option III is likely to be either (a) the diversion of domestic coal to foreign 
markets; or (b) the exit or partial exit of a portion of the U.S. coal industry from the business of mining 
coal.   
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The diversion scenario is distinctly problematic from an environmental and subsidies perspective.  
The United States is a significant coal exporter: over the last 25 years, U.S. coal exports have ranged from 
53 million short tons (1973) to 105 million  tons (1990).  The U.S. exported 88.5 million tons of coal in 
1995.48   Certainly, one attractive option for U.S. coal extractors faced with scarce permits and declining 
demand for domestic coal will be to drastically reduce domestic sales, and use the revenues from sale of 
now-surplus permits to cross-subsidize exports of coal to foreign markets.  From an environmental 
perspective, diversion of U.S. coal to foreign markets will simply depress the price of, and encourage the 
use of, coal abroad -- an environmentally perverse result.  From a WTO perspective, importing countries 
without an indigenous coal supply are unlikely to complain of subsidized coal imports.  However, 
countries that have domestic coal industries and that either import U.S. coal or compete with U.S. coal in 
third markets may bring subsidies challenges to protect their traditional markets.    
 
In these challenges, the allocation of surplus permits to U.S. coal extractors will be considered a 
financial contribution; the benefit will be measured by the total yearly revenues from surplus permit sales 
divided total coal sales of each company; and the specificity test will certainly be met.  Coal will be 
considered a “specific” industry.49   Thus, the only legal defenses to a subsidies challenge will the fact-
specific, economic defenses that the subsidy margin is de minimis, and/or that the subsidy/subsidized 
imports cause no serious prejudice/injury, respectively, to complainants.   The likely success, or not, of 
these economic defenses is hard to predict.  One the one hand, Option III calls for half the coal 
                                                 
     48Statistical Abstract of the United States (1997), Table No. 937, p. 590 and Table No. 930, p. 587. 
     49Foreign governments/WTO panels are not likely to buy the argument that subsidies to coal extractors should 
be considered integrally linked to subsidies to coal combustors under Option III, with specificity determined 
according to the numerousness and diversity of extractors and combustor combined.   The ‘integral linkage’ 
doctrine does exist in U.S. practice, where it has been developed to allow for the linkage of specificity 
determinations in respect of subsidy programs that are nominally separate but in fact “have the same specific 
purpose and bestow the same types of benefits on different users.”  See Live Swine from Canada: Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 61 FR. 52408, 52423 (Oct. 7, 1996).  But the doctrine has been 
narrowly construed.  Id. at 52514.  Commerce has required that different programs have the same specific purpose 
; sharing the same general purpose is not sufficient.  Id. at 52421.  Moreover, the different programs must “treat 
industries equally.”  Id. at 52422.  See also Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia: Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 59 FR 58814, 58817 (Nov. 15, 1994).  Here, Option III certainly could 
be characterized as a single program with the single general purpose of reducing carbon emissions from the United 
States.  However, its specific treatment of coal extractors, oil and gas producers, and coal combustors, respectively, 
is quite different and serves somewhat different specific purposes.   The specific purpose of the extractor permit 
requirement is mainly regulatory; the purpose of the combustor permit award is mainly compensatory.  Therefore, 
the issuance of surplus permits to extractors and combustors under Option III is not likely to be linked for specificity 
determination purposes. 
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extractors’ supply of permits to siphoned off to combustors.  Moreover, a substantial cache of permits 
will be needed to supply remaining inelastic U.S. coal demand in industries like steel and cement that 
depend on coal.   On the other hand, any rule that awards permits in respect of historic, domestic coal 
sales that are diverted overseas will create a very significant incentive to export and could yield quite 
substantial surpluses.  If economic analysis reveals the diversion scenario to be credible, it may be 
desirable to fashion an anti-diversion rule for coal extractors as well as oil and gas producers. 
 
The second possible strategy for coal extractors under Option III is one of exit or partial exit from 
the industry.  Certainly a mere downsizing of operations would raise not WTO issues if the output 
reduction is limited to the amount dictated by scarcity of permits: there would be no surplus permits and 
no subsidy.   The main subsidies litigation risk associated with an exit or partial exit strategy involves a 
scenario in which coal extractors reduce operations enough to generate sizable volumes of surplus 
permits, sale of which yields a non-de minimis subsidy for (i) remaining coal sales; and/or (ii) non-coal 
products manufactured by the same firms. 
 
Subsidization of remaining coal sales might conceivably trigger a challenge by foreign importers 
(or would-be importers) of coal who would argue that the revenues provided by sale of surplus permits 
cause ‘serious injury’ by enabling U.S. coal extractors to cut prices and maintain U.S. market share at a 
level greater than they otherwise would enjoy.   However, such a predicate for a ‘serious injury’ claim 
would be difficult to establish in practice inasmuch as domestic extractors, by definition, can create 
‘surplus’ permits under Option III only to the extent that they reduce their own sales of coal in the United 
States.50  It seems unlikely, furthermore, that foreign importers would bring a WTO challenge to 
complain of lost sales in an historically minuscule and shrinking U.S. market for imported coal. 
 
Subsidies to coal extractors in the form of salable permits would also be deemed subsidies to any 
non-coal products manufactured by those same firms.   Indeed, one environmentally desirable 
consequence of Option III might be to encourage coal firms to exit the industry in favor of other lines of 
                                                 
     50Foreign exporters may, of course, argue that reduced sales are not the same thing as reduced market share.  
Subsidies can cause serious injury if they allow domestic manufacturers to preserve or expand their relative share of 
a shrinking market.  Nonetheless, the difficulty of the case when combined with the smallness of the prize (a tiny 
and shrinking U.S. coal market for imports) is likely to dim any enthusiasm for  WTO litigation on the part of 
foreign coal extractors. 
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work.  This response, however, could provoke a WTO challenge by foreign competing manufactures of 
those subsidized non-coal products (e.g., cars, shoes, petrochemicals, etc.).   The merits of such a 
challenge would depend on the extent to which coal extractors (a) substantially exit the coal mining 
industry (generating large revenues from sale of now-surplus permits); and (b) manufacture a limited 
range of non-coal products (so as to focus cross-subsidies on specific categories of products).   It seems 
improbable that both these factors would come together in practice but, if they did, a subsidies issue 
might arise.  If further analysis reveals there is a real prospect of sizable surpluses accruing to coal 
extractors who are subsidizing specific new products, then it may be desirable to enact a rule limiting the 
time period in which coal companies can continue to amass permits in respect of historic U.S. coal sales. 
 
Treatment of coal combustors.  In a happy contrast to the situation of extractors -- who would 
have to hold one permit for each unit of fuel supplied, while receiving fewer permits than they need --  
coal combustors under Option III would receive their permits free of charge and free of any 
corresponding regulatory obligations.51  All permits issued to combustors would be ‘surplus’ and could 
be sold back for cash or fuel price offsets to fuel extractors (oil, gas or coal) who need permits.  Thus, the 
financial contribution and benefit implicit in the award of free permits to coal combustors would render 
them a clear case of indirect subsidy.52   
 
Here, 90 percent of the permits awarded coal combustors under Option III would flow to coal-
fired electric power plants and the remaining 10 percent would be distributed widely, with most of that 10 
percent concentrated in four major industries: primary metals, paper and paper products, chemicals and 
allied products, and food products.  The award of 90 percent of the permits to coal-fired electric power 
plants would clearly constitute a ‘specific’ subsidy to those plants.  As we observed in the discussion of 
Option I, although most electric utilities do not sell anything moving in international trade, they do sell 
                                                 
     51This important aspect of Option III is not stated directly in the Interim Report; it is implied in the Report and 
confirmed by telephone conversation with K. John Holmes, May 26, 1998. 
     52Again, the United States cannot defend the scheme against subsidies challenge by pointing out that free 
permits to coal combustors are offset by the higher fuel prices to those combustors.  That fact is irrelevant under the 
WTO.   The price signal generated by Option III is similar in economic effect to an economy-wide fuel tax, with a 
partial rebate of the tax to certain industries.   The Subsidies Agreement is clear that a rebate of general taxes to 
selected industries is an actionable subsidy if the industries thus favored are few enough to be ‘specific.’  The same 
conclusion is likely to apply to a permit requirement which produces a economy-wide increase in the price of fuel, 
while compensating coal combustors with valuable, salable permits. 
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electricity to manufacturing firms that export goods.   These firms would be deemed to have received an 
‘upstream subsidy’ if and to the extent that the utilities’ revenues from sale of permits are (1) passed on to 
customers in the form of lower electricity prices than would otherwise obtain; (2) bestow a competitive 
advantage on the downstream products, and (3) have a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing the 
downstream products.53   Under U.S. practice, at least, the fact that permit subsidies are ‘specific’ to 
electric utilities would render them per se specific to all the utilities’ customers as well.  However, unless 
the utilities were found to have channeled cost savings to certain favored customers, the benefits of 
permits (those passed on to customers) would be distributed over all utility customers.  Further economic 
analysis would be needed to determine whether the passed-through electricity price benefits to any single 
customer would be found competitively significant when allocated over the customer’s production lines. 
The remaining 10 percent of the coal combustor’s permits awarded directly to manufacturing 
facilities would probably not be considered specific subsidies.  Many different firms and industry groups 
would be eligible for, and would receive permits under the scheme, and the allocation of only 10 percent 
of the permits among the four broad industries described above is not likely to render such permits de 
facto specific.  
 
Option IV 
 
Option IV inverts Option III, with a twist.   Instead of requiring extractors to hold permits to sell 
and issuing ‘freeby’ permits to large combustors that can be sold back to extractors (as in Option III), 
Option IV would require large combustors to hold permits to emit (as in Option I) and issue ‘freeby’ 
emissions permits to compensate coal extractors.  Since coal extractors would  not need any of these 
emissions permits issued to support their own operations, they would be free to sell all the permits issued 
to them back to regulated entities who do need permits to meet regulatory obligations.  (Option IV is thus 
made politically attractive to coal extractors in the same way that Option III is attractive to coal 
combustors.)  Revenues obtained by coal extractors from sales of permits could then be (1) retained, paid 
to employees or dividended to shareholders; (2) used to cross-subsidize a transition into other lines of 
work; (3) used to offset the purchase price paid by domestic coal consumers (thereby reducing their 
disincentive to shift out of coal); and/or (4) used to cross-subsidize export sales of coal.  These are the 
                                                 
     53See Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada, 62 FR 5201, download p. 4 (February 4, 1997).   
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options open to coal extractors under Option III; the difference is that under Option IV, coal extractors 
would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with.  As in Option III, the U.S. government is likely 
to preclude the fourth response (cross-subsidizing exports) by regulation since using permit revenues to 
expand exports of coal would tend to displace, rather than reduce, global coal combustion, thereby 
undermining the global environmental objectives of the scheme.   
 
The ‘twist’ embedded in Option IV is that auto manufacturers who sell in the United States 
market also would be required to hold emissions permits (allocated on the basis of each automaker’s 
future emissions commitment for its fleet, on the basis of standard assumptions about vehicle miles 
driven).   Automakers would be allowed to buy permits from, or sell permits to, combustors or coal 
extractors on a market basis, subject to the regulatory requirement that each automaker must hold one 
permit for each unit of future emissions predicted from its fleet.   
WTO Analysis 
 
 The treatment of automakers under the cap-and-trade scheme (the ‘twist’) would not violate 
WTO rules provided it is implemented in a non-discriminatory fashion.  In particular, fleet emissions 
must be modeled via methodologies that are consistent for all fleets and do not discriminate against 
foreign manufacturers.   Any ‘subsidies’ to automakers conferred under Option IV by means of the 
availability of ‘surplus’ permits would not be actionable if  they are made available on a non-
discriminatory basis to foreign as well as domestic manufacturers.   Given the near-total blurring of 
national identity that currently characterizes the auto industry it seems unlikely that the prospect of 
bestowing subsidies on, say, Honda or Toyota would be politically explosive – particularly if those 
‘subsidies’ must be earned by emissions performance, and all automakers are equally able to earn them on 
the same terms. 
 
The issuance of free permits to large stationary combustors is also unlikely to raise major 
subsidies issues since such combustors, under Option IV, will not receive any meaningful volumes of 
surplus permits except to the extent they exit their industries, and they are unlikely to exit their main line 
of business merely in order to generate a relatively meager ration of surplus permits.  
 
The preferential treatment afforded domestic coal extractors, on the other hand, would raise the 
subsidies issues discussed in connection with the treatment of coal extractors under Option III, aggravated 
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by the fact that coal extractors under Option IV would receive permits unencumbered by regulatory 
obligations, and thus would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with.  In practice, the United 
States is an insignificant importer of coal, so foreign governments are not likely to bother complaining of 
domestic coal subsidies on import substitution grounds.  The main risk of a subsidies challenge would 
arise if, and to the extent that, U.S. coal extractors choose (and are allowed) to reduce U.S. sales (through 
downsizing production or diverting domestic coal sales overseas), continue to receive permits in respect 
of historic U.S. sales, and use the revenues from permit sales to cross-subsidize coal (or other product) 
sales in foreign markets.  In this event the by-now-familiar subsidies issues would arise: the value of 
surplus permits thus awarded would be financial contributions that confer a benefit on a specific industry: 
coal extraction.  They would be actionable if they caused injury or serious prejudice to interests of 
competing producers of a like product. 
